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Accountability: A democratic concern
Accountability arrangements, as relations between rulers and ruled, are assumed to be crucial for the democratic quality of a polity. A democratic vision is that citizens decide how they shall be organized and governed politically. In situations where a few make binding decisions on behalf of a community, democratic norms prescribe that they shall be accountable to the citizens. The greater the power of the decision makers, the more important it is to establish effective accountability mechanisms (March and Olsen 1995:152) .
Why then has public accountability become a buzzword and an obsession (Borowiak 2011 , Dubnick 2011 , Pollitt and Hupe 2011 , Bovens, Goodin and Schillemans 2014 ? Why do accountability processes sometimes attract considerable public attention and citizens' involvement, whereas at other times they escape public notice? When and why can we expect increased calls for accountability and what are drivers of demands for explanations, justifications and sanctions? 1 I explore accountability relations in contemporary Europe. I give priority to accountability related to the terms of political order, the role of rank-and-file citizens, and the conditions under which accountability processes attract few or many participants and issues. Currently, the European state-centered order is challenged by Europeanization, internationalization and devolution, as well as competing ideas about the legitimate role of democratic politics in society. There are claims about the withering of the nation state, democratic deficit, the hollowing out of representative institutions, and legitimacy crisis. The aim of this paper is to provide an analytical framework for understanding the shifting significance of accountability processes. Increasing demands for accountability are interpreted as part of larger debates and struggles over the terms of political order.
Theorizing the relationship between political order and democratic accountability brings political science back to its roots. It calls attention to competing ways of thinking about political life and popular self-government: the kinds of activities democratic politics and governing are and the institutional contexts within which these activities typically take place in a specific area and era; the organization of authority, power, responsibility and accountability; ways of handling conflicts and the conditions for legitimate order and change.
This kind of reflection is particularly important when established orders are undergoing transformations, the situation in which Europe finds itself today. Accountability is, however, costly in terms of time, energy and resources and excessive monitoring damage trustrelations. As a result, there is search for and contestation over mutually acceptable balances between authorizing and restraining agents. In the following I present an analytical framework for understanding such balancing acts and I explore how the shifting significance of accountability processes is affected by three aspects of political order: political association, organization and agency.
Making sense of the shifting significance of accountability An accountability relation involves actors obliged to render an account to other actors in a domain under specific circumstances, with the latter having the right and resources to require, assess and sanction the account. Accountability processes involve moral-ethical standards, facts and causality, as well as power and action capabilities. They can be interpreted as part of order-maintaining or order-transforming processes (Eisenstadt 1995) , that establish order where none exists or challenge, reform or replace an existing order.
They can be conceived of as apolitical, technical or political processes.
When accountability processes are seen as apolitical, technical policing, designed to sustain or strengthen an order, their task is to understand what happens and why -to detect errors, malpractice or criminal acts and to control and sanction incompetent and unruly agents.
Accountability is a question of correct reporting, truth-finding and securing compliance with the established regime. Accountability assumes (near) consensus about political order and normative standards and implies enacting a polity's repertoire of routines and fulfilling role expectations, duties and commitments. Accounting and auditing specialists interpret and respond to experience using the standard operating procedures and templates of institutions and professions. They attribute responsibility, call the responsible parties to account, and recommend sanctions. The challenge is to secure effective accountability and improve government by incorporating experience into new routines.
Increasing demands for accountability are likely to reflect discontent with the causal, normative and power basis of the order or its development. Politics exists because individuals do not agree, and there is a perceived need to find compromises a community can live with (Mouffe 2005, Hay and Stoker 2009) . As a consequence, more aspects of accountability have to be treated as endogenous to democratic politics, and accountability as a neutral technique has to be supplemented by accountability as politics, including public reasoning and contestation over what is a possible, reasonable and just political order. Accountability conceived as politics within an existing political order also assumes that most people accept the order as legitimate. There may be causal uncertainty or disagreement about what is true and justifiable. Accountability processes, nevertheless, take place within institutional frames and orderly transfer of powers. For example, mainstream principalagent approaches assume pre-determined dyadic relations of principals and agents, competing policy preferences, and non-cooperative strategic games. Principals have the power to decide success criteria and incentives and there is asymmetric information in favor of agents (Gailmard 2014 ). The challenge is related to control and compliance, making agents comply with the principal's rules and goals, and preventing them from misusing their powers.
A democratic hope is that discontent with specific governments, politicians and political parties can be combined with trust in, and support of, the political order. Citizens may oppose the incumbents in office and still respect the office, and there may be reservoirs of favorable attitudes that make them tolerate policies they are against (Easton 1975) .
Arguably, criticism of policies and personnel, the ability to impose sanctions on decisionmakers who do not act in accordance with their mandates and the ability to replace governments provide a safety valve for loss of trust in, and revolt against the political order (Olsen 2010).
Accountability theory, nevertheless, cannot assume agreement on political order. A political order is an institutional arrangement for allocating authority, power, information, responsibility and accountability. At times, and in some areas, political life is highly institutionalized. There are well defined boundaries, institutionalized rules and practices, shared normative and causal understandings and adequate collective resources. At other times and other places political life is less orderly. Boundaries are less well-defined. There are fewer and weaker institutions and enduring divisions and antagonisms, i.e. competing allegiances and loyalties, normative and causal understandings, and less adequate common resources. Over time, political life achieves or loses structure, and the nature of order changes (March and Olsen 1998:303-304 ).
The paper, therefore, addresses accountability related to the politics of the terms of political order -situations where established institutional arrangements have limited legitimacy and public support. There is no dominant interpretation of legitimate order and determining who-is-accountable-to-whom-for-what is part of the processes through which order is formed, maintained and changed (Olsen 2015) . The politics of accountability involves struggle over political association: the borders of political entities and who shall belong to An expectation is that in normal times in highly institutionalized polities, accountability processes are likely to be dominated by apolitical-technical processes aimed at ordermaintenance. When orders are weakly developed, contested or in transformation public attention and citizens' involvement are likely to increase. Accountability processes are politicized and become order-transforming. The following sections explore in more detail how the significance of accountability processes are likely to be affected by the political association and historical experiences of a society, its political organization and institutional arrangements, and political agency and actors' motivations and capabilities.
Political association: Unity, diversity and experience Individuals associate and dissociate in a variety of ways and demands for accountability are Or they may be tied together by a shared civic identity and an ethos embedded in a pact prescribing what is reasonable, fair, and just. To belong to a community means to conduct one's life in ways that are accepted by the community. Behavior is governed by prescriptions and routines based on a logic of appropriateness derived from an identity or role Olsen 1989,1995) .
Accountability is a virtue as well as a mechanism (Bovens 2010 ) and democratic ideals assume that freely associating individuals accept each other as autonomous and equal citizens. The people is supposed to decide collectively what kind of society is worth living in and to give mutually acceptable reasons for how they shall be associated and live together.
However, the democratic form of association is at best an achievement and cannot be taken for granted. The belief that democratic citizenship dominates all other identities has to be held up against the possibility of relations characterized by deep-seated distrust and hate and an existential battle between groups that see each other as threatening their form of life.
A friend/enemy-relation may be dominant especially in exceptional situations of crisis and emergency (Schmitt 1927 ).
Democracy as a legitimation principle, furthermore, does not prescribe the terms of association precisely. It is unclear who is to be included in "the people" -whether demos should be constituted on the basis of territoriality, nationality, history, or being affected (Goodin 2007) -and also how different legitimate values are to be balanced (Dahl 1989 , Rothstein 2011 . The term gives few clear and stable answers when it comes to what accountability is assumed to accomplish and how citizens can effectively call rulers to account.
The term democracy itself gives vague guidance because the term refers to developmental processes of reflection, reason-giving and contestation, rather than static normative and organizational principles. Accountability processes involve more than implementing and enforcing the preferences of predetermined principals. They provide an occasion for contestations of how normative and organizational principles are to be legitimately interpreted and applied. Democracy is an arrangement for developing and transmitting identities and beliefs (Dahl 1989 ) and encompasses demands for explanation and justification regarding what democratic association is for and what it means to act democratically. There is search for purpose, direction and meaning, and attempts to make the world intelligible in normative and causal terms. Intelligence and virtue are products of political action (March and Olsen 1995 , Olsen 2014 , March 2015 ).
An implication of the imprecise nature of democracy is that accountability theory needs to take into account that citizens may disagree over forms of political association and that they may change their minds, rather than stick to specific normative and organizational principles.
There are likely to be different and shifting visions of how autonomous politics should be in relation to society and disagreement about whether popular participation and representation should have priority in relation to other values and interests. Competing visions of political association are likely to generate different accountability claims, suggesting that it may not be fruitful to assume a static type of association and cleavage structure, predetermined and exogenous to democratic politics. Rather, accountability can be related to dynamic conceptions of association. For example, both internal differentiation and large-scale migration across cultures create heterogeneity and dynamics that complicate the balancing acts involved in governing a territory and population -that is, reconciling unity and diversity, coping with unresolved conflict, making binding decisions and remaining a political community, and reconciling order and flexibility, individual freedom and collective action capabilities.
It may be useful to assume that history matters and that forms of association and accountability demands are influenced by experience with the trustworthiness of representatives, officials and fellow citizens gathered through generations. People can come to believe that decision-makers have to be continuously monitored, kept under scrutiny and held to account in order to prevent misuse of power, or that decision-makers are trustworthy and behave reasonably and justly most of the time (the Scandinavian countries being an example). The more mistrust a people has in its decision makers, the more likely that agents are tightly monitored and called to account. The approach attends to how reliable and competent behavior can be achieved through coercion, rules, incentives, deliberation, bargaining, recruitment, education, socialization and habituation (Olsen 2013 (Olsen ,2014 (Olsen ,2015 . Acceptable behavior can be secured through the external control of opportunity and incentive structures, which make the expected utility of complying greater than non-compliance. Self-control can be achieved through character formation, which ensures that codes of appropriate conduct are understood and respected even when behavior is not monitored (Olsen 2013 (Olsen :460-461,2014 . The more routines of external and internal controls are seen as legitimate and trusted, the less likely it is that there will be detailed monitoring and intense accountability-claims. The more suspicion there is of ineffective mechanisms, and the more conflict, the more monitoring and accountability demands there will be.
Political organization theory has for some time considered the territorial state to be the prevailing form of organization. The state has been conceived of as a sovereign unitary actor with constituent power, expressing the public will. Norms prescribe a clear allocation of authority, power, responsibility and accountability. Focus is often on formal-legal rules.
Language is shaped by industrial society. Governmental institutions are interpreted as instruments, apparatus and machinery and a result of organizational engineering and structural choice. Olsen 1989,1995) .
Under such conditions it is probably not fruitful to assume a sovereign principal with normative and coercive authority, command, and control. There are multiple channels of accountability; a variety of mechanisms for rendering, assessing and sanctioning accounts, competing and contested accountability claims, and appeals to different audiences and normative standards (Bovens, Curtin and t'Hart 2008) . The importance of elections and hierarchical authorization and accountability depends on the shifting power of votes and elected assemblies. Appointed and self-appointed guardians of order, reason, truth, justice, freedom, and equity have to be held accountable to (some version of) the foundational principles of a democratic-political order. So have organized interests, financial actors, private enterprises, lobbyists, religious leaders, and mass media (Moncrieffe 1998) .
Accountability theory has to consider non-electoral and non-hierarchical mechanisms of accountability and how different institutions require different motivations and capabilities of citizens (Elkin and Soltan 1999). For example, compound polities have different mixes of three (stylized) forms of access structures (Cohen, March and Olsen 1972, Olsen 2015) suggesting different roles for citizens in accountability processes.
Participatory democracy and open structures allow all citizens and issues access to all decision opportunities. A democracy is a community of explanation and justification and informed consent is the basis of governmental authority (March and Olsen 1995:146,150) .
Citizens have the right to call rulers and each other to account in terms of democratic standards. They have influence through referenda, direct administrative contact, courts, opinion polls, citizens' juries and rights of inquiry, protest demonstrations, civil disobedience and media activity. Still, confidence in rank-and-file citizens has varied over time and modern democracy requires citizens to let representatives act on their behalf. A challenge is to organize governmental institutions in ways that make elected representatives and nonelected officials responsive without the continuous participation of citizens while simultaneously holding them accountable to the public for their (in)actions.
Representative democracy and hierarchical structure is the most legitimate form of order in contemporary democracies. Popular votes and legislative decisions are decisive. There is a chain of authorization and accountability with free public debate, competitive elections, majority law-making and parliamentary and administrative scrutiny as key accountability mechanisms. The elected is agent and the electorate is principal, public administration is agent and legislative, executive and judicial institutions and citizens are principals. There is disagreement about the proper balance between market, judicial and expert power and political-democratic institutions. In brief, Europe faces a struggle over enduring issues related to the terms of political order: the balance between levels of government and between institutional spheres; the relation between the sovereign people and the sovereign individual and between collective and individual responsibilities; the appropriate realms of majority decisions and inalienable rights and freedoms; the importance of citizens' involvement compared to peace and security, economic competitiveness and prosperity, religion, and equal life chances.
The EU claims to draw its legitimacy from its citizens and their trust in the Union depends on perceived benefits of membership, lack of corruption and trust in institutions (Arnold, Sapir and Zapryanova 2012). Considerable resources have been used to prevent and detect fraud.
There is well-developed horizontal accountability through institutional checks and balances.
Still, critics hold that there is a democratic deficit. EU institutions, they claim, are unrepresentative, non-transparent and not accountable to citizens. There is a need to de-constitutionalize some economic rights and increase the room for political maneuver, but little enthusiasm for reforms requiring treaty revisions (Scharpf 2015) .
The EU has elements of a guardian democracy (Dahl 1989:320 There is a perceived need to (re)gain the trust of citizens and bridge the gap between those who govern and the governed.
History has mattered. The Union's governance structure was not designed for democratic accountability, and parliamentary accountability is still "remarkably weak" (Weiler 2012:251) .
There is lack of genuinely European parties, a limited space of public communication and the connections between the results of elections and political developments are loose.
Referendum is an instrument to sanction rulers and enforce accountability, but citizens cannot vote government out of office (Rose 2013) . Consensus style policy-making makes it difficult to attribute accountability, thereby expanding the space for accountability politics and blame games as well as providing opportunities for actors to cultivate their reputation and legitimacy (Busuioc and Lodge 2015) .
A possible lesson is that intense accountability-demands are likely in polities in transition where competing conceptions of accountability-regimes and political orders collide. The terms of order are influenced by historic and existing power relations. The ability to call others to account and remain unaccountable is an indicator of power (Day and Klein 1987:9) and accountability-demands are likely when power relations and the causal and normative beliefs and interests they are based upon are challenged or changed. Political conflict can be a source of incremental change or of the breakdown of an old order and the emergence of a new one based on different principles. Conflict can be an engine of learning, emancipation and progress or of suffering and destruction, and tensions ca escalate due to a tendency to find mitigating circumstances for friends and blame adversaries.
Arguably, mechanisms of institutional specialization, separation and autonomy help the EU to cope with inconsistent accountability-claims that create conflicts and stalemates at constitutive moments (Olsen 2007 Ch. 9,2010 . Still, the more complex, conflict-prone and dynamic a political order is, and the more interdependence, power-sharing and compromises it accommodates, the more room that order has for accountability politics and
competing interpretations of what has happened, why it happened, whether what happened is good, and whether things could have been done differently. Under such conditions, it can be an insurmountable task to objectively disentangle the contribution of specific actors and institutions, attribute responsibility, blame and praise, and hold actors to account democratically (Easton 1975, March and Olsen 1995:157-158) . Sometimes there are fact-free claims of accountability deficits (Bovens, Curtin and t' Hart 2010) and "emotional storytelling" (Galeston 2010).
Political institutions, however, provide a framework that affects but does not determine how things are understood, justified and acted upon. Institutions exist because a sufficiently high number of citizens believe they exist (Searle 1995) Political agency: Attention, acceptance and capabilities Accountable government implies purposeful agency -discretion, will, reasoning and deliberate choice -rather than determinism (a divinely ordained or natural order) or pure chance, and it is consistent with democratic faith to argue that "choice in politics is both possible and necessary". Things do not need to be the way they are. In a democracy, "the last word goes to the politicians and in the end, via the process of accountability, to the voters". Political leaders have significant control and can be assigned responsibility. Their decisions can be understood and assessed by citizens (Lewin 2007:180,182 ).
Nevertheless, conceptions of well-informed citizens calling power-holders to account on issues that are important for them (Hutchings 2005) have to be held together with an old observation. Being a citizen does not appear to be an important role, nor political participation an intrinsic good. Participation in public affairs is regarded with indifference by vast numbers of citizens. Popular interest in political matters remains sporadic. The average citizen seems to find the exercise of political rights burdensome, boring, and often lacking in significance. Politics possesses little prestige. The individual increasingly seeks political satisfaction outside the traditional area of politics (Wolin 1960:353) .
In brief, the idea of well-informed, rational and active citizens is a democratic norm that is not always realized and accountability theory cannot assume that access opportunities are used continuously. The entire population is rarely activated. People may lack motivation and/or action capabilities. Thus, if it is assumed that accountability processes normally are dominated by professionals and the standard operating procedures of specialized and hierarchical institutions, and that most citizens are unlikely to participate most of the time, when are open structures likely to attract large numbers of citizens and issues?
Calls for accountability may follow from shifting public attention. During normal times most political-administrative decisions are made without public attention. Accountability processes are driven by routine scrutiny involving accountants and auditors, political and organizational leaders, and ready-to-use narratives that provide explanations and justifications and assign praise and blame. The public is activated by extraordinary events, disasters, performance crises, scandals or conflicts. Unexpected major threats may evoke appeals to unity, activating citizens within institutionalized channels of participation or to issues that divide a population, mobilizing citizens in disruptive forms.
The public is also likely to be activated by more enduring political contestation over the terms of political order, and changes in the international discourse during the last decades have generated more and different accountability demands. The New Public Management ideology has been a driving force for public sector reforms and new accountability demands (Laegreid 2014 ) and the "reinventing government" movement has used a less anti-political and more apolitical language, advising better rather than less government and public services (Saint-Martin 2001) . The public sector has been assumed to work better and cost less by using standardized measures, quantifiable indicators, administrative control systems, and by empowering customers and clients. Belief in network governance and making public officials accountable via market-like mechanisms has replaced belief in hierarchical government. Priority has been given to economy and efficiency -to how rather than what and why-issues.
New accountability-claims followed from elections and shifts in governmental power.
Politicians contributed to anti-political attitudes and accountability claims by creating unrealistic expectations by promising more than they could keep in order to win elections and by describing opponents in negative terms, tendencies strengthened by a "culture of cynicism" in the mass media (Hay and Stoker 2009) . The realm of democratic politics was challenged by end-of-history narratives portraying global markets and the liberalconstitutional state as the institutional foundations of society. Traditional politicaldemocratic rights were dismantled through transnational processes -free trade agreements and international dispute settlement bodies protecting investors and private economic rights, with a norm-making and polity-building character across policy-areas (Isiksel 2013:194) . The room for political maneuvering was also affected by a rights revolution and the transfer of "an unprecedented amount of power from representative institutions to judiciaries"; an empowerment of a juristocracy (Hirschl 2004:71) .
The reforms illustrate that accountability processes are part of a struggle over people's minds, their expectations and their aspiration levels, and accountability-demands are likely to depend upon citizens' zone of acceptance (Simon 1957:12) . Citizens' zones of acceptance defines legitimate purposes, powers, methods and outcomes and the ruled are unlikely to Accountability is assumed to be taken care of by those whose duty it is to do so and specialized actors and routines are seen to work reasonably well. Standby citizens are willing and able to participate, but not continuously, and not as long as they think their concerns are attended to even when they do not participate in active supervision, monitoring and scrutiny of rulers.
Increased accountability-demands are likely to follow from changes in knowledge, norms and power relations that generate discontent and disillusion with an order's cognitive, normative, and power-bases. These are situations where the basic assumptions on which a political order is instituted are discredited as being illegitimate, inefficient, immoral, or exploitive. Existing explanations and justifications are no longer seen to make sense. Trust is eroded and prescriptions not obeyed. Citizens can gradually lose faith in institutions and actors, or specific events can lead to radical change. Increasing demands for accountability are especially likely when expectations and aspirations are generally disappointed, when there are unsatisfactory explanations and justifications, or when conflicts are seen as threatening.
Whereas struggle over the terms of political order is likely to attract attention, challenge peoples' zones of acceptance and activate accountability demands, calling rulers to account and sanctioning them requires adequate resources and alternative sources of information.
For democracies, it is difficult to reconcile the ideal of political equality with increasing socioeconomic inequality. Power based on number of votes competes with power based upon economic, organizational, informational and military resources and accountability-claims are likely to be affected by citizens' action capabilities. While citizens may not call rulers to account because they are satisfied with their performance, they may also be inactive because they believe they have no chance to make a difference; for example, if they are disillusioned and feel apathetic, fatalistic, or powerlessness; or if they think that politics is none of their business, politicians are corrupt and they do not listen to people like them (Amnå and Ekman 2014).
The European Union illustrates that disengagement is an alternative to increased accountability-demands and that efforts to strengthen citizens' involvement are not always successful. As part of the Union's attempts to change its image, 2013 was declared the "European Year of Citizens", dedicated to citizens' rights in shaping the future of Europe. The
Citizens' Initiative, which gives European citizens the right to petition the Commission, however, requires organizational muscles. To be taken up by the Commission, an initiative has to be backed by at least one million citizens from at least seven member states, with a minimum number from each state. The Commission promises to examine initiatives, but is not obliged to propose legislation. The results of this and several other participatory mechanisms have been modest (Boussaguet 2016 (Battista, Setari and Rossignol 2014:126,129 ).
The European case also raises questions about to what degree rulers actually control the terms of political order and can legitimately be called to account when these terms shift. A new multi-level and multi-centered order is evolving through complex interactions between supra-national, intergovernmental, and transnational processes rather than following a single master plan (Olsen 2007 (Olsen ,2010 . A democratic vision is that democracies are able to change incrementally and adapt to a variety of shifting opportunities and challenges. Yet, the importance of intention and consistent structural choice in the development of political orders varies. It is contested to what degree political institutions are, or even can be, deliberately structured and re-structured, or whether they are evolving incrementally over time as an unplanned artifact of historical processes (Mill 1861, March and Olsen 1983) .
Institutions formed under specific historical circumstances are used to solve problems in quite different historical-institutional contexts. Complex and dynamic orders composed of multiple interacting components are unpredictable and uncontrollable. Feed-back is more or less fast, reliable, and easy to interpret. There are complicated loops and imperfect learning (March 2010) . Institutional change characterized by co-evolution, rather than a single dominant process and driving force, makes it difficult to objectively attribute responsibility and facilitates political contestation over who-is-accountable-for-what, as well as what constitutes appropriate accountability regimes and a legitimate order.
It may be useful for accountability theory to examine under what conditions institutional choice is a tool for pre-established principals, rather than to take for granted that politicaladministrative institutions and traditions are easily malleable. It may also be useful to examine the belief that experiential learning secures improvement, or in other words, that progress is guaranteed through a self-organizing and self-correcting polity driven by free debate in civil society, electoral competition among political parties, pluralistic bargaining among interest groups, competitive markets, or scientific and technological progress.
Theories of accountability have to address both limitations in rulers' control and citizens'
obligations. First, given the particular roles, relations and powers that structure democratic politics, a political virtue is to act well. However, action is also demanded, or believed to be demanded also when governments are impotent with respect to the issues they face (Philp 2010 (Schillemans and Busuioc 2014) , has relevance for citizens as the ultimate source of democratic power. Making unattainable accountability-claims may cause trust in the political order to decline -a possibility more likely if it is correct that the ancient idea that citizens, as responsible members of a political community, are accountable to each other for their performance, is alien to modern democracies (Borowiak 2011:93,97 ).
To conclude, increasing demands for explanations, justifications and sanctions can be interpreted as a positive democratic phenomenon. Today's citizens are more capable and demanding, with a growing confidence in their own political opinion. There is less deference to hierarchies and less fear of authorities (Hay and Stoker 2009) . Authority has become reflexive rather than based upon subordinates' willingness to follow commands of superiors while holding their own assessment of alternatives in abeyance (Simon 1957:126) . Increasing accountability-demands can, however, also be interpreted as overburdening democracies (Crozier, Huntington and Watanuki 1975:9) when governments are called to account for things they do not control.
Theorizing democratic accountability: Back to the roots Theorizing democratic accountability and the role of citizens calls attention to issues ranging from whether a single rule is broken or a budget misused to contestations over political order. It involves approaches ranging from book-keeping and the discipline of accounting to institutional approaches viewing the development of accounts as a core task of governance, on par with developing political identities and rules of appropriate behavior, organizational capacities and political adaptiveness (March and Olsen 1995:44-45) . Some prefer a restricted use of accountability linked to specific institutional spheres and actors, in particular elections, voters and formal-legal authorities. This paper takes seriously the idea that democratic citizens have the right to call their rulers and each other to account and presents a dynamic conception of what accountability means and implies under different institutional circumstances.
The obsession with accountability has been interpreted as part of a struggle over the terms of political order in a period when the legitimate position of different territorial levels of government and the role of democratic politics in society are contested. In such periods, more is at stake in accountability processes than an apolitical, technical clarification of facts and causality and disciplining incompetent or unruly agents. To theorize accountability processes implies exploring multiple accountabilities in shifting contexts as well as some timeless aspects of political organization. That is, to combine an interest in a shifting studyobject with a return to the roots of the discipline: the normative-ethical, causal, and power basis of different orders and the role of citizens in constituting and changing the terms of political order and accountability regimes. Rather than assuming highly institutionalized and static democracies, accountability processes may be seen as part of an historical struggle between order and reform (Mill 1956:57-58 ) and a possible transition to a new and yet unrealized or unrecognized political order (Bendix:1968:9 Mainstream political science has, however, shown only modest interest in developing behavioral theories of political organization after World War II, in spite of the fact that students of political life historically have viewed establishing and maintaining political order as a core governmental task (Wolin 1960) . They have seen well-organized institutions as a precondition for civilized co-existence and have explored how political organization affects the well-being of citizens. Many factors have contributed to these developments. There has been considerable formal-legal institutional stability in western democracies during the period and strong democratic-legal norms regarding how political institutions shall be understood. Academic specialization has focused attention on single institutions more than the political order at large. "Idealist" political theory assuming normative standards and rights exogenous to politics has generated a "displacement of politics in political theory" (Galston 2010:386-387) . Political science has not regarded organization theory as particularly relevant (Olsen 1991) , a tendency strengthened as organization theory has migrated to business schools. Learning is imperfect and experience does not guarantee improvement and equilibrium solutions.
This paper does not aspire to provide final answers about how accountability processes work in modern democracies. It invites debate and empirical studies of the organizational basis of democratic accountability and how the significance of accountability processes, and citizens' perceived need and ability to call rulers to account, are likely to be affected by shifting terms of political order. A dynamic conception of democratic accountability suggests that: (a) political association involving different mixes of unity/diversity, trust/mistrust and historical experiences generate different potentials for accountability claims; (b) political organization and institutionalized behavioral routines, ordering ideas and resources, make a polity more or less able to cope with divisions and generate acceptable solutions, and affect the felt needs and the options for the ruled to hold rulers accountable; and (c) political agency and different and shifting public attention, zones of acceptance, and action capabilities influence which available options are actually used.
Understanding how political orders affect accountability processes is a first step in theorizing the relationship between democratic accountability and political organization. The next step is to explore in more detail how order-maintaining and order-transforming accountability processes affect political orders, their democratic quality, and the possibility of civilized co- 
